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There is now considerable disquiet about the appropriate monetary strategy that 
central banks should follow in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. Several 
influential commentators have called for the abandonment of inflation targeting. 
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still be appropriate after the crisis.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
In the January 31, 2013 issue of Financial Times, Charles Goodhart argued that the recovery from 
the Great Recession (GR) of 2007-2008 has been slow and disappointing. There are indications that central 
banks of major industrial countries are using different monetary policy strategy. For example, suggestion that 
Bank of England is moving towards targeting nominal income, Bank of Japan emphasising employment 
growth  and  the  Federal  Reserve  setting  a  limit  for  unemployment  are  all  indications  of  central  banks 
direction  monetary  policy  towards  output  and  employment.  Taking  Goodhart’s  suggestion  further,  it  is 
imperative to see how different types of targeting evolved prior to the GR.  
Inflation targeting as a strategy for conducting monetary policy became popular among the industrial 
and developing countries during the decade of 1990s. The strategy for conducting monetary policy in the 
1970s, 1980s and the 1990 respectively changed from money supply targeting, inflation control and central 
bank independence and inflation targeting. It is interesting to note that the change in the strategy occurred at 
the same time for the countries that followed the above monetary policy strategies.   
Oechsle (2013) argues that “Krugmanite” is a strategy under which the central bank has the mandate 
to target some growth rate of nominal GDP. The central bank attempts to maintain the actual growth rate of 
nominal GDP within the target through the use of monetary instruments. Under this strategy, if because of 
some unexpected negative shocks, the target is missed, the central bank uses its instrument to maintain a 
higher future rate of growth.  
The purpose of this paper is to examine the extent to which real sector targeting has replaced other 
forms of targeting in three major industrial countries. In Sections 2-4 the concept of targeting and different 
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forms of targeting are examined. Theoretical discussions and empirical results are presented in Section 5, 
and summary and concluding results are offered in Section 6. 
 
2.  Monetary Targeting 
 
In  conducting  monetary  policy  some  variables  such  as  inflation,  rate  of  growth  output  and 
unemployment rate are called final targets and some such as money supply, interest rate and exchange rate 
are  called  intermediate  targets.  The  central  bank  attempts  to  influence  the  final  targets  by  setting  the 
intermediate targets. 
For a successful targeting, an intermediate target must meet the following conditions: 
i.  The relationship between intermediate and final targets must be stable. If this condition is 
not met, changes in the intermediate target may not influence the final target or it may 
change the final target in an undesirable direction.  
ii.  Data on the intermediate target must be available prior to the data on the final target. This 
condition  allows  the  central  bank  to  forecast  the  future  changes  in  the  final  target  by 
observing the behaviour of the intermediate target. 
iii.  The intermediate target must be under the control of the central bank. 
Monetary targeting was exercised during the 1970s for controlling inflation in Britain, United States, 
Canada, Australia and New Zealand. This procedure relied on Friedman Schwartz (1963) where the authors 
showed a long run close relationship between money and prices in the United States. 
Monetary targeting adds to the credibility of the central bank and prevents inflationary consequences 
of a discretionary policy based on the choice between growth and inflation. Moreover, the existence of a 
target creates transparency in implementation of monetary policy and allows the privates sector to anticipate 
the direction of monetary policy. 
The central bank cannot control both money and interest rate simultaneously. If money is controlled 
interest rate is left free and vice versa. Poole (1970) proposed conditions for choosing money or interest rate 
as an intermediate target.  Poole assumed that the objective of the central bank is to minimize the deviation 
of output from its desired level. 
Monetary targeting is preferable if the economy is subject to a real sector shock such as changes in 
consumption, investment or exports.  Interest rate targeting is preferable if the source of instability is from 
the financial sector.  
Monadjemi and Kearney (1990) showed that in the 1970s in the United States, United Kingdom, 
Canada, Germany and Australia monetary targeting was successful in reducing inflation. During the 1980s, 
financial innovations and financial deregulations caused a considerable instability in the velocity of money. 
Fluctuations in the velocity of money introduced several problems in conducting monetary targeting. For 
example, financial deregulations led to a significant expansion of bank deposits and the supply of money 
(money supply include bank deposits). An increase in the supply of money without a corresponding rise in 
nominal GDP led to a fall in velocity of money. Most of the above-mentioned countries suspended monetary 
targeting in the 1980s. 
 
3.  Exchange Rate Targeting 
 
  During  the  1980s,  several  countries  conducted  monetary  policy  by  targeting  the  exchange  rate. 
Stability of the exchange rate is important particularly for countries that international trade comprises a large 
proportion of their aggregate economic activity. 
  In 1979, in the context of the European Monetary System (EMS), eight European countries decided 
to limit fluctuations of their exchange rates within ± 2.5 percent relative to the German Mark. EMS was 
successful  in  keeping  the  inflation  rates  of  the  member  countries  in  line  with  the  rate  of  inflation  in 
Germany, which was the lowest in Europe. EMS actively continued operation until 1992 when a significant 
depreciation of the British Pound and an increasing limit of fluctuations to ± 15 percent automatically caused 
the  breakdown  of  the  system.  Eventually  the  European  Monetary  Union  and  the  single  currency  were 
introduced  in  1999  and  the  European  Central  Bank  (ECB)  was  assigned  the  task  of  managing  euro’s 
liquidity.  
  In the commodity producing countries, the exchange rate is highly correlated with the commodity 
prices. In these countries exchange rate targeting may cause problems that are similar to the Argentine 
(2001), Mexico, (1994) and Britain (1992). In these cases eventually the central bank floated the exchange 
rate. Monadjemi, M. and Lodewijks, J., 2014. Post Inflation Targeting Monetary Policy: A Study of Britain, Japan and the United States. 
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4.  Inflation Targeting 
 
During the 1990s, some countries such as Australia, Brazil, Britain, Canada, Chilli, Norway, South 
Africa, Korea, and New Zealand commenced conducting monetary policy base on inflation targeting. In this 
procedure, the central bank attempts to conduct monetary policy such that the expected rate of inflation 
remains within a specified range. Countries that exercised inflation targeting were successful in keeping their 
rate of inflation within the targeted range. 
The  preference  of  price  stability  against  growth  and  employment  was  demonstrated  in  Rogoff 
(1985). Rogoff argued that the society is better-off if the objective function of the central bank is different 
than the objective function of the society. In other words the monetary authorities must be conservative with 
an objective function that assigns higher weight to price stability than employment. Decisions made by a 
conservative central bank must be independent of the expansionary policies of the government. Alesina and 
Summers (1993) showed that over a decade, Germany and Switzerland with most independent central banks 
experienced lowest possible rate of inflation. 
Preference of price stability over employment follows separate articles by Friedman (1968) and 
Phelps (1968). Both studies showed that an expansionary monetary policy increases employment in the short 
run but in the long run employment returns to the natural rate and inflation remains at a higher level. In other 
words, in the long run an expansionary monetary policy increases inflation without affecting unemployment.  
Kyland and Prescott (1977) society’s welfare is improved if in conducting monetary policy the central bank 
follows a rule rather than discretion. The authors showed that conducting monetary policy based on a rule 
generates no inflation whereas a discretionary monetary policy produces positive inflation. Rogoff (1985) 
argues that in the absence of productivity shocks, inflation targeting is the best strategy because it has no 
trade-off between inflation and unemployment.  
In Argentine one unit of local currency was set to one US dollar. This procedure reduced inflation 
but created banking crises. In 1994 Mexico attempted to limit fluctuations of peso against the US dollar. 
However, political turmoil and the loss of foreign exchange reserves forced the government to devalue the 
peso. In 1992 Britain was forced to leave the EMS fixed exchange rate system when Bank of England 
experienced heavy losses.  
Inflation targeting is not suitable in the presence of a supply shock. In this case control of inflation is 
associated with a large drop in output and employment.  
In inflation targeting by publicly announcing targets and monetary policy strategy the central bank 
becomes more transparent and responsible. Mishkin and Posen (1997) argued that those countries that  
implement  inflation  targeting  must  have  developed  financial  markets,  macroeconomic  stability,  an 
independent  monetary  policy  and  a  credible  monetary  policy.  Moreover,  the  central  bank  must  not  be 
committed to maintain the exchange rate. 
The logic behind the inflation targeting is based on the long run policy ineffectiveness of monetary 
policy. In the long run monetary policy affects prices but not output. 
The importance of maintaining an inflation target varies among different countries. At the top of the 
list is New Zealand where the governor of the central bank’s job depends on the maintenance of the inflation 
targets. Inflation targeting is not sensitive to the terms of trade shocks because generally prices of food, 
energy and interest rate on mortgages are excluded from the consumer price index. Prices of these items are 
very volatile and cause changes in the aggregate supply curve.  
Those economists who are against the inflation targeting such as Debelle and Fischer (1994) and 
Posen (1995) argue that in Germany and Switzerland inflation targeting was successful enforced at the cost 
of high unemployment. Recently most of the macroeconomists and central bankers believe that maintaining 
a low inflation target leads to macroeconomic stability in the long run. Supporters of inflation targeting are 
not in favour of zero inflation. They argue that since nominal wages are rigid downward, having a positive 
inflation is the only way to reduce real wages and create employment. Moreover, maintenance of a very low 
inflation target may lead to the dander of deflation. Bernanke and Mishkin (1997) argue that similar situation 
existed in Japan in the late 1990s. 
Svensson (1999) identifies three features for inflation targeting: 
i.  Existence of a clear numerical target for inflation, 
ii.  Forecasts of inflation as a framework for conduction monetary policy, 
iii.  High level of transparency and responsibility.  
McCallum (1996) examined the success of inflation targeting in Canada, Britain, Sweden and New 
Zealand that conducted monetary policy in the context of inflation targeting in 199o to 1993. All of these Monadjemi, M. and Lodewijks, J., 2014. Post Inflation Targeting Monetary Policy: A Study of Britain, Japan and the United States. 
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countries  used  consumer  price  index,  excluding  food  and  energy  prices,  as  a  measure  of  price  level. 
McCallum argues that inflation targeting is preferable to the discretionary policy because in the latter method 
more attention is paid to the benefits of an expansionary policy than the costs of the policy.  
McCallum showed that high rates of inflation that existed in the above mentioned countries in the 
1970s and the 1980s, declined to 2 to 4 percent in the 1990s. 
Among the developed and developing countries respectively New Zealand and Chilli were the first 
countries  that  commenced  inflation  targeting.  Bosede  (2004)  showed that  before  the  implementation  of 
inflation targeting the average rate of inflation in the developed and the developing countries were 3.72 and 
13.11 percent respectively. 12 months after the implementation both rates declined to 2.71 and 8.3 percent 
respectively. 
 
5.  Real Sector Targeting: Empirical Evidence 
 
The choice between inflation targeting and real sector targeting is similar to the choice between 
fixing the price and letting the quantity be determined in the market or setting the quantity and letting the 
price to be freely determined. The authorities cannot set the price and quantity together at the same time. 
Historically, real sector targeting rather than inflation targeting became important when the economy was far 
away from the potential output and inflation is not a serious problem. Notable examples of real sector 
targeting are during the Great Depression of 1930s and the GR of 2007-2008.  
Figures 1 and 2 show quarterly data on inflation and growth of real GDP for Japan, United Kingdom and 
United States, 1990- 2013. 
 
Figure 1. Inflation Rates: Japan, United Kingdom, and United States 
Source: All of the series in this study including CPI, growth rates, government expenditure and nominal GDP for Japan, 
UK and US were collected from the OECD website under quarterly national income account. 
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Figure 2. Growth Rates: Japan, United Kingdom, and United States 
 
Figure 1 indicates stability of the inflation rates in three countries over roughly about 14 years (1992 
to 2006). This period coincides with the period of inflation targeting in all of the three countries. However, 
the prolong period of tranquil inflation stability did not continue as inflation rates behaved erotically after 
2006. 
Figure 2 also shows a prolong period of about 17 to 18 years growth for three countries prior to the 
GR of 2007-2008. All of the three countries experienced a dramatic fall in their growth rates in 2008. 
Subsequently the fall of growth rates were reversed as governments’ macroeconomic policies and rescue 
packages attempted to restore output and employment. The primary emphasis was placed on growth rather 
than inflation.  
Further information regarding volatility of inflation and growth rates in three selected countries prior 
and after 2007 are reported in Tables 1and 2. 
 
Table 1. Standard Deviations of Inflation Rates 
Country  1992-2006  2007-2012 
Japan  0.91  1.34 
UK  0.93  1.33 
USA  0.66  1.60 
 
Table 2. Standard Deviations of Growth Rates 
Country  1992-2006  2007-2012 
Japan  0.49  0.93 
UK  0.40  0.96 
USA  1.12  2.31 
 
Both tables show more volatile inflation and growth in the latter sub-period. Stability of the inflation 
rates during the earlier period is indicative of the inflation targeting which was less emphasised as output and 
employment significantly dropped during the GR in most of the affected countries.  
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Figure 3. General Government Expenditure: Japan, UK and USA 
 
Figure 3 shows that government expenditure in three countries rose steadily until beginning of the 
financial  crises  and then after a  sharp  fall  started  to  rise again indicating  fiscal authorities  intention to 
compensate  for  the  decline  in  output  and  employment.  Figure  3  also  suggests  that  falling  government 
expenditure around 2007 may have contributed to the recession in three selected counties. Monadjemi (2011) 
argues that rising oil prices coupled with falling government expenditure contributed to the recession in the 
United States in 2008. 
Further evidence on inflation targeting is provided using Hodrick-Prescott (1997) (HP) filter. HP 
method divides a time series into growth and cyclical components. Using a statistical filter, the growth 
component  can  be  removed,  leaving  the  cyclical  component  as  deviations  around  a  smooth  trend  line. 
Assume Y is a time series on real GDP or CPI. 
 
𝑌 = 𝑦𝑐    + 𝑦𝑔 
where 𝑦𝑐   𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑦𝑔 respectively are cyclical and growth components of Y. Assuming that inflation targeting 
was in effect 1990 – 2006, the cyclical component of CPI is not expected to deviate substantially from the 
trend line. However, with the abolition of inflation targeting after 2006, price level is uncontrolled and is 
expected to deviate from the trend line.  
Applications of HP method for US, UK and Japan are presented in Figures 4 to 9. 
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Figure 4. Hodrick-Prescott Filter US CPI 1990-2006  Figure 5. Hodrick-Prescott Filter US CPI 2007-2013 
   
   
   
Figure 6. Hodrick-Prescott Filter UK CPI 1990-2006  Figure 7. Hodrick-Prescott Filter UK CPI 2007-2013 
   
   
   
Figure 8. Hodrick-Prescott Filter Japan CPI 1990-2006  Figure 9. Hodrick-Prescott Filter Japan CPI 2007-2013 
 
All of the figures indicate that prices moved much more closely along the trend lines in 1990 – 2006 
than they did in the latter period after 2006. In cases of UK and US in the earlier period, CPIs moved almost 
completely on the trend lines. These figures provide further evidence on the stability of the prices in three 
countries enforced by the existence of inflation targeting prior to the GR. 
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6.  Conclusions 
 
Macroeconomic Policy is under review after the harrowing experiences with the global financial 
crisis  and  its  lingering  effects,  especially  in  Europe.  The  International  Monetary  Fund,  for  example,  is 
sponsoring several conferences on ‘Rethinking Macro Policy’. There is considerable divergence of views 
about what the appropriate monetary targets should be after the crisis. A pivotal statement in this respect is 
the paper by Blanchard et al (2010). This study looks at “what we thought we knew” about the benefits of 
having just one target of inflation and how “we were wrong” and that “what we have learned from the crisis” 
is that central banks aimed for too low a level of inflation. The target should be raised to provide liquidity 
more  broadly  and  to  reduce  the  value  of  real  debt  when  extensive  financial  deleveraging  is  occurring. 
Coming from an institution such as the International Monetary Fund, which had been a champion of inflation 
targeting in the past, really does indicate how much central bank behaviour has been transformed. 
Michael Woodford (2012, 2013) suggests caution before we discard the conventional wisdom. Our 
empirical results support this proposition. Inflation targeting has provided stability for medium-run inflation 
expectations before the crisis and has prevented a deflationary spiral, during and after the crisis. What the 
profession has learned is that inflation stabilization, in itself, does not guarantee macroeconomic stability. A 
more flexible form of inflation targeting is called for. For example, a central bank may target nominal GDP 
in such a way that it hits an inflation target over a medium-run rather than in the short-run.  Official interest 
rates might be lowered even if inflation targets are not being met at that point in time as long as nominal 
GDP is below or is trending below a nominal GDP target. Similarly, interest rates may be raised even if 
inflation targets are being met if there are indications of excessive debt accumulations, property bubbles and 
fear of financial crises. Monetary policy needs to be cognisant of not only inflation and real activity forecasts 
but also the spectre of financial crises. 
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